The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race
and Social Justice
Volume 18

Number 1

Article 1

1-1-2015

Trouble Behind the Great Wall: A Critical Look at Workers’ Rights
in China.
Scott Walther

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Scott Walther, Trouble Behind the Great Wall: A Critical Look at Workers’ Rights in China., 18 THE SCHOLAR
(2015).
Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol18/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St.
Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social
Justice by an authorized editor of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu.

Walther: Trouble Behind the Great Wall: A Critical Look at Workers’ Rights

ARTICLES

TROUBLE BEHIND THE GREAT WALL?
A CRITICAL LOOK AT WORKERS' RIGHTS IN CHINA
SCOTT WALTHER*

China is basically controlled by the capitalists. . . . It seems that the
government chooses not to see certain things, so we must keep
shouting complaints into their ears non-stop. Only after they hear us
will they start seeing. Our parents' generation would keep their
heads down and endure. But our generation is different. We need to
feel at ease. The most important thing in life for us is to realize our
values. No matter if it's life, love, work-we are not going to be
humiliated like our parents were.'
Qing Tong
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INTRODUCTION

"In an era of globalization where multinationals draw on labor and
capital resources across national borders, labor relations and employment
practices are still fundamentally bounded by domestic legal regimes. "2
Indeed, the fundamental argument is that globalization has allowed large
multinational corporations to shop for low cost labor markets with little
intervention by governments. 3 These markets are attractive to multinational corporations because their labor standards and laws tend to be
poorly regulated and enforced.' Specifically, China's labor class has been
abused and exploited by multinational corporations because of the country's failure to adequately enforce its labor laws.'

2. Virginia E. Harper Ho, From Contracts to Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation Under China's New Labor Legislation, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35, 38 (2009).
3. See Aaron J. Lodge, Globalization:A Panaceafor the World, Or Conquistadorof
International Law and Statehood?, 7 OR. REV. INT'L. L. 224, 264 (2005) (discussing nebulous legal jurisdiction of free trade zones where factories and production plants known as
maquiladorasoperate with few laws or regulations).
4. See Ho, supra note 2, at 38 (stating the argument that labor, environmental, and
social regulations are sacrificed in the intense competition for investment and jobs).
5. See id. (discussing the argument that "inadequate or poorly enforced labor standards in developing countries are to blame for spurring a 'race to the bottom,' as intense
competition for investment and jobs pushes labor, environmental, and social regulation
toward the lowest common denominator").
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Recently, in response to widespread discontent with previous labor
laws that favored big businesses, China passed the Labor Contract Law
(LCL) in 2008.6 The law purports to grant employees additional rights
that had been lacking, including compelling employers to complete and
enforce contracts with their employees.' Furthermore, the law is widely
recognized by the government and multinational corporations affected by
the law, as an effective means to protect Chinese workers.' The current
enforcement mechanism in place, however, is ineffective and does not
adequately represent workers' interests.'
The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU)-the only trade
union legally recognized by the country-does not effectively protect the
class of workers the union is mandated to protect.o Further, its mission
embodies an inherent contradiction:" The union's mandate is supposed
to represent workers' rights while also protecting state interests.1 2 As an
organ of the government, it is seemingly impossible for the union to represent both parties in an effective manner.13 In addition, the enforcement of the LCL is delegated to local branches of the ACFTU.1 4 These

6. Li Jian & Chen Peiyong,
;
[Brief Introduction
of Regulations on Enforcement of Labor Contract Law], 6 CIINA L. 72, 72 (2008).
7.
AA
(2012 $1E) [Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (2012 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Dec. 28, 2012, effective Dec. 28, 2012) art. 1 http://en.pkulaw.cn.skell.idm.oclc.org/
display.aspx?id=1 3222&lib=law&SearchKeyword= Labor%20Contract%20Law%20of%20
the%20People%27s%20Republic%20of%2OChina&SearchCKeyword= ("The [I]aw is formulated for the purposes of improving the labor contractual system, clarifying the rights
and obligations of both parties of labor contracts.").
8. See Jian & Peiyong, supra note 6, at 72 (implying employers have become more
aware of the ramifications of lawful employment and the signing of labor contracts).
9. See generally CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, PROTEcINo WORKERs'
SERVING1
THE PARTY: THE WAY FORWARD FOR CIIINA'S TRADE UNIONS (2009), http://

RiGHrs OR

www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/research-reports/acftu-report.pdf (suggesting that, as a
government arm in the Communist system, the ACFTU will favor State interests when
balancing workers' rights and state interests).
10. See id. at 3 (proposing that delegating enforcement duties to local, provincial trade
unions leaves the labor enforcement system open to varying interpretations of how enforcement must occur).
11. See id. (reporting on the "complex identity of the ACFTU and show[ing] how it
has become increasingly politicized, passive and subservient to the Party and
government").
12. See id. (stating the ACFTU purports to both defend workers' right and serve the

CCP).
13. Id. Because it is an arm of the Communist government, it instinctively puts state
interests above those of the Chinese workers. Id.
14. Id.
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local branches, which are often operated by local business enterprises, are
also ineffective at enforcing workers' rights."
Studies and investigations have been conducted by labor watchdog organizations, such as China Labor Watch and China Labour Bulletin. It is
evident that even under the newly formed LCL, multinational corporate
influence still plays a significant role in the widespread violations of Chinese workers' rights.16
Part II of this article provides relevant background information of the
development of China and the process/effect of globalization. Part III
introduces and discusses the development of Chinese labor law. Part IV
analyzes China's labor system and the violations of labor laws that exist
within its borders. Part V analyzes the effectiveness of the labor enforcement mechanism in place in the ACFTU. Part VI outlines solutions that
should be implemented in order to effectively secure workers' rights in
China. Part VII and VIII analyze the ACFTU while examining the effect
of globalization on labor workers' rights.
I.

BACKGROUND

China's economic development has helped to propel the nation to
share the global stage with other world superpowers." Chinese labor and
economic law, as it is known today, began to develop around the time the
People's Republic of China (PRC) was established." The PRC, the
country's current political regime, was founded in 1949 by the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP).' 9 Led by Mao Tsedong, the CCP was a political faction that implemented several economic, social, and political campaigns that yielded disastrous results.2 0 These campaigns included the
Great Leap Forward (1958-1959), the Hundred Flowers Campaign
(1957), and the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).21
The Great Leap Forward was a failed economic experiment because it

15. See id. at 23 (stating political duties have undermined the union's goals of defending workers' rights at the enterprise level).
16. Id. The influences are made possible through globalization and through the ineffectiveness of the ACFTU. Id.
17. See generally Country Profile: China, LIBR. OF CONG.-FED. Res. Div. (Aug.
2006), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/cs/profiles/China.pdf (narrating China's development from
a new nation in 1949 to a world power, economically and politically, because of the developments the government underwent).
18. See id. at 5 (implying contemporary Chinese law began in 1949 with the rise of the
CCP).
19. See id. (describing the turmoil existing in the region at the time that lead to establishment of the new government).
20. See id. (inferring the early CCP was extreme in their attempts at imposing reform
and change).
21. Id.
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focused on communal farming and reduced economic flexibility. 2 2 Simi-

larly, the Hundred Flowers Campaign actively repressed intellectual activities within China because intellectuals posed a threat to the Chinese
government. 23 The Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution was a movement that actively sought to remove alternative political groups to the
one-party Communist government. 24 These experimental movements severely hampered China's economic, social, and political progress, the
consequences of which would be felt for many years to follow.

A.

25

Post-Detente

Following the death of Mao in 1976, China began to undergo a period
of economic reform that allowed for greater interaction with the outside
world under the new successor Deng Xiaoping.2 6 Economic reforms
were necessary due to the setback from the failed experiments of the
Mao regime.2 7 President Richard Nixon's visit to the country in 1973 was
regarded as one of the first important steps towards reform and improving relations with the outside world.28 This began to thaw the icy relations between the communist PRC and the capitalist United States.2 9
Nixon's visit marked the beginning of the period of d6tente-or lessening
of tensions-this, along with the significant reforms conducted by the
Chinese government, paved the way for China to enter the world economy and feel the effects of more open-market-based economies.:o

22. See generally John Gittings, Understanding Revolutionary China, 133 CHINA Q.
152, 153-55 (1993) (examining the activities of the Great Leap Forward and its detrimental
consequences of the implementation of its extreme agricultural practices).
23. See generally Erin E. Douglas, The Struggle for Human Rights Versus Stability:
The Chinese Communist Party and Western Values Clash, 29 DENV. J. INTL'i. L. & Po,'y
151, 162 (2001) (examining Mao's Hundred Flowers Campaign, which focused on removing political dissidents and intellectuals that could pose a threat to the Communist regime).
24. See generally Gittings, supra note 22, at 155 (concluding the Cultural Revolution,

which acted to suppress alternative political ideals, was not beneficial and ultimately led to
China becoming a single-party state).
25. See generally Country Profile: China, supra note 17, at 6 (generalizing China did
not begin to implement beneficial reforms until approximately twenty years after the failed
Maoist experiments).
26. See id. at 5 (referring to Deng Xiaoping's rise to power and his initiatives to end "a
generation of extreme animosity toward Washington").
27. See generally id. at 5-6 (stating the dramatic reforms that took place in China
beginning in 1978 that "eventually made China one of the largest world economies and
trading partners" were a result of the government realizing that the actions of the past
were mistakes).
28. Id. at 35.
29. Id.
30. See generally id. at 6 (theorizing that through d6tente, the relationship between
China and the United States became a lucrative one for both countries and the economic
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Despite the significant improvement during this time period, several
issues still remained." The PRC continued to be very autocratic by actively suppressing any perceived threat to the economic, political, or social welfare of China.32 These "threats" typically came in the form of
illegal labor strikes.
Authorities would respond to these strikes with
"heavy-handedness [by] rounding up activists and crushing independent
labour groups" and their movements.34 Historically, a major criticism of
the Chinese government's response to perceived instability is "its failure
to protect and enforce constitutionally guaranteed individual [citizens']
rights against the state."" Unlike the judicial system in the United
States, the National People's Congress (NPC), and not the Chinese judiciary,3 6 is the ultimate authoritative power responsible for creating and
enforcing constitutional rights.3 7
The government of the PRC endured many growing pains from 1949 to
1982, adopting five different constitutions over only a thirty year period."
The inconsistencies created an unsound governmental infrastructure that
gave rise to political corruption within the CCP's high ranks." Additionally, throughout the PRC's existence, there have been substantial

ambitions of China). The Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, science, and national
defense) became the preeminent agenda within the party, state, and society. Id. The wellbeing of China's people increased substantially, especially along the coastal areas and in
urban areas involved in manufacturing for the world market. Id.
31. See generally id. (stating for all of China's improvements during this time, many
people believed that certain areas of China's society, particularly politics, were lagging
behind). Yet, politics, the so-called "fifth modernization," occurred at too slow a pace for
the emerging generation. Id.
32. See id. (stating the Communist regime has, since its inception, suppressed perceived threats to the State, regardless of form). "The democracy movement, however, was
violently suppressed by the military in the 1989 Tiananmen incident." Id. "Citizens cannot
express opposition to the CCP-led political system and do not have the right to change
their national leaders or form of government." Id. at 41. "In 2003 . . . journalists, authors,
academics, and researchers were reportedly harassed, detained, and arrested by the authorities." Id. at 42.
33. See generally Labour unrest: Out brothers, out!, Tim EcoNoMisIr (Jan. 31, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21641275-guangdong-province-pioneers-new-appro
ach-keeping-workers-happy-out-brothers-out (implying that because independent trade
unions are banned, many of the disruptions within contemporary Chinese society are led
by "workers, taxi drivers, and teachers" trying to enforce their rights).
34. Id.
35. Ernest Caldwell, Horizontal Rights and Chinese Constitutionalism:Judicialization
Through Labor Disputes, 88 CHi.-KENr L. Riev. 63, 73 (2012).

36. Id. at 65.
37. Id. at 65-66.
38. Id. at 64.
39. See generally id. at 64-65 (illustrating the numerous constitutional changes China
has faced since the establishment of the PRC to accommodate shifts in political power and
the socio-economic environment, and Western criticism for "absence of individual rights").
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problems with Chinese labor laws.4 0 For example, the only legal labor
union through which Chinese workers may organize is the wholly statecontrolled ACFTU.4 1 Conflicting interests such as this, coupled with the
complete authority the NPC has over legislative interpretation, leaves
Chinese labor workers with limited means to seek redress against their
government. 42
B.

Post-Accession to the World Trade Organization and Contemporary
China

On December 11, 2001, China became the 143rd member of the World
Trade Organization (WTO). 4 3 Accession to the WTO led to extensive
legislation in China, making it more market-oriented, as opposed to the
traditional control-based economy in other Communist nations. 4 4 This
legislation increased China's exposure to foreign direct investment by
corporations and national governments.4 5 As a result, this has led to
many labor issues within China. 4 6 These issues range from excessive

40. See generally Edward Wong, Global Crisis Adds to Surge of Labor Disputes in
Chinese Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/world/asia
16china.html?-r=1& (implying the significant increase in labor disputes brought to court
are due to improvements sought by the Chinese government, but involve issues that have
always existed and still exist in China).
41. See id. (asserting Chinese workers have to rely on government-run labor unions to
protect their individual rights).
42. See Caldwell, supra note 35, at 65-66 ("The constitution does not stipulate the
method of enforcement nor what, specifically, enforcement actually entails."). Issues related to constitutional supervision are typically marginalized. Id. at 66; see also Christopher Duncan, Out of Conformity: China's Capacity to Implement World Trade
Organization Dispute Settlement Body Decisions After Accession, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
399, 404 (2002) (voicing "within the [Communist] framework, civil rights and liberties are
of little concern," and that the government of China places public order above the individual rights of the people).
43. Duncan, supra note 42, at 403-04.
44. See id. at 405-07 (suggesting in order to accede to the WTO, China had to radically adopt a large amount of legislation in order to appeal to the more market-oriented
countries, including the United States).
45. See generally id. at 402-05 (indicating the more market-oriented legislation allowed foreign companies to profitably invest in China).
46. See CHINA LABOR1 WATCH, 2013 ANNUAl.
REPORT
(2014), http://
chinalaborwatch.org/2013%2OAnnual%2OReport%20FINAL.pdf (highlighting the labor
issues that surrounded the Foxconn facility where child labor was being utilized); see also
Jianyong Yue, What does globalization mean for China's Economic Development?,
GLOBAL Po.'y J. (May 24, 2012), http://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/24/05/2012/
what-does-globalization-mean-china%E2%80%99s-economic-development ("implicating
labor issues have "impeded China's industrialization by locking in Chinese enterprises at
the low-end of the global value chain, preventing them from upgrading along the technological ladder"). See generally CI-nNA LABOR WATCH, 2012 ANNUAl. RvoPR'T (2013),
http://chinalaborwatch.org/lmages/2012.pdf (concluding China has many labor issues, espe-
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overtime and unsafe working conditions, to child labor, and insubstantial
pay.4 7 Since the government benefits from this influx of foreign money,4 8
the PRC is driven by monetary interests in protecting foreign businesses
rather than strictly enforcing its own labor laws.49
II.

GLOBALIZATION

Globalization is a complex process that affects nations and governments across the world.o It allows the world's population to interact and
become more integrated on political, economic, and social levels.5 1 In
particular, for the purposes of this piece, globalization makes national
economies more susceptible to international influence. 52
A.

Globalization Defined

Globalization is defined as the rise of interconnectivity in the world
through increased movement of trade, labor, culture, and technology.53
Essentially, it is the union of the "processes by which the peoples of the
world are incorporated into a single world society, global society." 5 4
Globalization allows corporations to "free[ly] move goods and money anywhere in the world that affords an opportunity for profit, without govcially pertaining to loss of bonuses and lack of clarity when factories need to relocate due
to globalization).
47. See also 2013 ANNUAL REPORr, supra note 46 (underlining the labor strikes at
Foxconn and other facilities). See generally 2012 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 46 (outlining the Chinese labor issues pertaining to insufficient bonuses, unsafe working conditions,
child labor, etc.).
48. See Country Profile: China, supra note 17, at 22 (specifying the amount in USD
China receives in foreign aid and foreign investment); see also Caldwell, supra note 35, at
65-66 (explaining how the government has the power to ultimately determine the constitutionality of governmental action); Country Profile: China, supra note 17, at 20 (asserting
other trade unions have failed to establish a separate trade union from the ACFTU, resulting in the government having ultimate control of the only labor union in China).
49. See generally Yue, supra note 46 (inferring because China's enterprises are at the
"low-end of global value," the Chinese government would turn to more valuable business
interests). The government has a significant interest in all companies/factories/manufacturing plants in China. Id.
50. Lodge, supra note 3, at 224.
51. Id. at 229-30; see also JAN A. SciHoiLTE-, GLOBALIZATION: A CRiICAL INTRODUCTION 49 (2d ed. 2005) (claiming globalization creates an interdependence between countries and communities).
52. See generally Lodge, supra note 3, at 226-27 (inferring globalization is a global
process which intertwines national economies and societies with other international interests); Sciioi-rE, supra note 51, at 54-55 (discussing four concepts of globalization-internalization, liberalization, universalization, and westernization-that do not recognize the
"novelty and transformative potential of globalization" in modern times).
53. Lodge, supra note 3, at 229.
54. Id.
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ernment interference.", 5 Countries differ in terms of culture, resources,
economies, and ideals, as such, there is a natural gravitation towards the
benefits of globalization (as defined).56 This process has been an important reason why our world is so interconnected today." Many countries
benefit from the free flow of information between governments, however,
benefits are often accompanied by consequences.5 " These consequences
are distinctively seen in many countries around the world, including
China.
B.

History/Development of Globalization

Globalization has existed in many forms throughout history. 60 Early
examples of globalization occurred in the empires of Rome and Britain.'
Globalization also opened the door to international trade between Europe and China. 62 The modernized version of globalization takes the
form of multinational corporations, mass media, and capitalistic enterprises.63 According to Jan Scholte, Professor of Politics and International
Studies at University of Warwick, UK, a significant portion of growth in

55. See id. at 229 (quoting David C. Korten, When CorporationsRule the World 4 (2d
ed. 2001) (concluding when the world economy becomes integrated, it gives multinational
corporations a freer market to maximize profitability).
56. See generally id. at 237-38 (implying countries, with their diverse strengths and
weaknesses, would seek to compensate their weaknesses through interaction with other
nations).
57. See generally id. at 229 (inferring when "products, services, currency, ideologies,
religions, and culture [move] between countries," it inherently aids in the interconnectivity
of the world).
58. See id. at 242-45 (emphasizing the different advantages (spurs competition, increases living standards, offers greater access to technology) and disadvantages of globalization, including overspecialization, ostracizing nations that do not engage in globalization
as fully, and unreasonably influencing national markets).
59. See generally Yue, supra note 46 (asserting the Chinese economy has endured as
its enterprises being rendered obsolete when China had no choice but to integrate into the
world economy through globalization).
60. Lodge, supra note 3, at 232 ("Historically, globalization occurred through international trade, territorial imperialism, and colonization.").
61. See id. (demonstrating even before the term "globalization" was invented, Rome
and Britain were already practicing trade of products, religion, and culture past their respective borders).
62. See generally id. at 231 (stating, in ancient times, globalization arose from trade
ships carrying specialized products of a region to other nations). Globalization, through
international trade, brought Chinese silk to Europe and European gold and culture to
China. Id.
63. See id. at 232-33 (explaining the four historical developments-colonization, industrial revolution, technology, and capitalism-led to the creation of modern globalization, with capitalism being most influential). See generally SCiHOLTE, supra note 51, at 136
(affirming capitalism has played a significant role in globalization as we perceive it today).
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international and social connections transcending national borders is the
result of improved economic conditions derived from globalization. 6 4
These economic conditions stem from capitalist development and international mobility of capital and labor.6 5 In China, there was a growing
trend to convert the Chinese economy into a "socialist market economy." 6 6 Because the government began to expose employers to capitalistic tendencies and market forces, employers could no longer count on the
subsidies that came hand in hand with the previous socialist "planned
economy." 67 Without the subsidies, employers cut labor costs to maximize their profits. 68 When the capitalist method of maximizing wealth
accumulation is combined with liberalized employers in dire need of foreign investment, it becomes a recipe for exploitation and abuse. 6 9 As
stated by Qing Tong, a shop-floor activist turned bestselling author,
"China is basically controlled by the capitalists.

government chooses not to see certain things."7 0
C.

. .

. It seems that the

Benefits of Globalization in China

Modern globalization has taken on the spirit of liberalization:7 ' First, it
gives lesser developed nations access to larger markets and foreign direct
investment, 7 2 second, it allows countries to have easier access to advanced technology and capital, 73 and finally, it provides greater possibili-

64. SCHOLTE, supra note 51, at 136-37.
65. See id. at 136-37 (emphasizing the capitalist method of production, in terms of
using surpluses to further production, has effectively fueled globalization).
66. Ronald C. Brown, China's Employment Discrimination Laws During Economic
Transition, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 361, 363 (2006).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in the People's Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1050, 1050
(2006) ("China's extraordinary economic success is marred by widespread labor abuses,
epitomized by the manufacturing sweatshop[s] staffed by ill-treated workers migrating
from China's hinterland."). See generally Lodge, supra note 3, at 248-49 (emphasizing in

order to profit from globalization, an industry often disregards labor laws which may result
in "extreme physical dangers to workers and the use of children as expendable cheap labor."); Yue, supra note 46 (implying because many Chinese enterprises are behind the
curve technologically, foreign enterprises can be viewed as a means of improving China's
economy).

70. Kathrin Hille, et al., Striking Out; Reportage, FINANCIAL

TIMEs, July 17,

2010, at

22.
71. Lodge, supra note 3, at 235.
72. See generally id. at 235-36 (giving an example of how Portugal has seen greater
participation from private entities though the liberalization of its economy).
73. Id. at 236.
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ties for people to ascertain information through the internet.7 4 This gain
can be offset, however, when a country censors substantial information
from its citizens. 5 Globalization also allows different regions to specialize in certain areas of the world economy-a concept known as "comparative advantage."" China is inhabited by 1.3 billion people,"
encompassing "about one quarter of the world's workers and about 1.5
times the combined workforce of all developed states."" Because China
has such a large labor force, it is no surprise that approximately one-third
of its economy is dedicated to manufacturing cheap goods and exporting
them to countries across the world.
D.

Deficiencies of Globalization in China

Globalization creates a benefit by creating comparative advantage,
however, this is also a deficiency of the system because it can lead to
8
overspecialization.so This problem is particularly prevalent in China.
While globalization has enabled China to become a manufacturing superpower, it has also made China overly reliant on its manufacturing expertise to sustain its economic growth." This is due, in part, to multinational
corporations' ability to appeal to corrupt politicians within the Chinese
The CCP, often described as "omnipresent,"84 has a unigovernment.
versal presence, especially when it comes to economic growth and imple-

74. See id. (stressing how globalization has advanced technology and how the modern
idea of sharing information on the internet has improved the life of many around the

world).
75. See generally Madison Park, China's Internet firewall censors Hong Kong protest
news, CNN (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/29/world/asia/china-censorshiphong-kong/ (affirming China, during the democratic movement in Hong Kong, censored
several social media sites in order to insulate its general populace).
76. Lodge, supra note 3, at 237.
77. The World Factbook: China, CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/ch.html (last updated Sept. 4, 2015).
78. SUSAN A. AARONSON, How China's Employment Problems Became Trade
Problems: China, Labour Law and the Rule of Law (Inst. for Int'l Econ. Pol'y, George
Washington U., Working Paper No. 3, 2010).
79. See generally The World Factbook: China, supra note 77 (stating 30.3% of the
labor force is classified under an industry occupation which includes manufacturing and
distribution; implying it is inevitable for a country with such a large labor force to base its
economy on utilizing its most valuable asset: its people).
80. See Lodge, supra note 3, at 243 (stressing overspecialization may cause an economy to become dependent on trade as the only means of survival).
81. See generally id. (applying the concept of overspecialization to China's singular
reliance on its labor force to manufacture goods cheaply for export).
82. See id. at 243-44 (asserting once a country has become successful at something, it
can be nearly impossible to retreat from it or diversify its economy).
83. See generally K.R. Sudhaman, Impact of Globalization and its impact on China,
MEDA MIMANSA, Jan.-Mar. 2009, at 83-84, http://www.mediamimansa.com/7th%20issue/
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mentation of labor policies." In fact, wherever there are companies or
joint ventures, there is a standing mandate to establish a "branch" of the
Party so that the government may be involved." This indicates that even
with the establishment of foreign influences on the country, through its
"omnipresence," the Chinese government is always involved to some degree." Modern globalization is fueled by maximizing the bottom dollar." Labor laws often times inhibit maximization, and as a result,
corporations actively seek to either avoid or incentivize local governments from enforcing these laws.8
III.

A.

CHINA's LABOR LAW

1994 Chinese Labor Law

In the wake of Chairman Mao's failed economic policies, China was
left without an effective structure to govern their evolving labor population.90 Evidenced by economic and social factors, as well as an overall
sense of dissatisfaction with existing law, it became clear that the government needed to adopt the reforms proposed by the 1994 Labor Law.91
As a result of the increased influence of globalization, "[i]n 1994, China
passed its first labor law regulating employer and employee relation-

7eng-83-85.pdf (illustrating how multinational corporations have had an influence on
China's corruption).
84. Xiao Li, Legal and Economic Development with Sui Generis Chinese Characteristics: A Systems Theorist's Perspective, 39 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 159, 185-87 (2014).
85. See generally id. at 185-89 ("The CCP represents (1) society's most advanced productive forces; (2) advanced culture; and (3) the needs and interests of the greatest majority of the Chinese population.").
86. Id. at 187-88.
87. See generally id. at 185-89 (implying the CCP's "omnipresence" derives from its
involvement in social and economic affairs occurring in China).
88. Lodge, supra note 3, at 248-49.
89. See id. (suggesting corporations must break the law to make a profit because
"carefully follow[ing] local laws or customs" is not always profitable).
90. See Country Profile: China, supra note 17, at 5.
91. See Tu LAN & JOHN PICKLES, China's New Labour Contract Law: State Regulation and Worker Rights in Global Production Networks (Capturing the Gains, U.N., Working Paper No. 5, 2011), http://www.capturingthegains.org/pdf/ctg-wp-2011-5.pdf (detailing
the reasons why the Chinese government needed to adopt new reforms to remain economically and socially viable: the central government needed to make reforms to deal with
large deficits derived from the previous labor system and the increased number of workers
in the private sector that were not legally protected).
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ships." 9 2 The law was a significant departure from China's traditional
Communist policies.
The 1994 Labor Law granted significant rights to employees that had
not existed under previous regimes in the PRC.9 4 The law set general
policies that sought to streamline existing policies.95 Any modification to
these policies by employers, such as the extension of working hours, had
to first be approved by the labor union.96 The law included employee
rights to rest, take vacations, and to "work in an environment that is safe
and does not endanger their health"-all newly founded rights that had
Further, another important
not previously existed in the workforce.
feature of the 1994 Labor Law was that an individual employment contract could not "contain clauses that [were] less protective than the ones
contained in a collective contract. "98
Even though the 1994 Labor Law established many new rights that
purported to aid Chinese laborers, this law was met with greater and
greater dissatisfaction and scrutiny:
Increasing dissatisfaction with the old law centered [sic] on three aspects of the law. First, the law focused solely on the termination of
the labor contract without paying enough attention to when and how
a contract comes into being. In many cases, employers would simply
refuse to sign a contract, which effectively invalidated obligations required in the law. Second, the law was widely regarded as vague and
overly simplified, and many potential abuses were not covered by the
law. Third, the old law had nothing to say about informal employment and precarious work, which officially did not exist in the early
1990s. During the years between the old Labour Law and the new
Labour Contract Law, thousands of administrative regulations had
to be promulgated by local governments to deal with these omis-

92. Sharon Hang, Comment, Investing in Human Rights: Using Bilateral Treaties to
Hold Multinational Corporations Liable for Labor Rights Violations, 37 FORDIHAM INT'jL
L.J. 1215, 1224 (2014).
93. See LAN & PICKLES, supra note 91 (noting this law was the first time laborers in
China could enter into contracts with their employers). "Before the reforms, there were
no labour contracts because all workers were supposedly the 'masters of the nation' with
permanent positions . . . in state-owned enterprises." Id.
94. Hang, supra note 92, at 1224-25 (discussing the additional rights provided by the
1994 Labor Law).
95. See id. at 1224-25 (outlining several general policies that were incorporated into
the 1994 Labor Law, including guaranteed minimum wages to be set locally, a limited
working day of eight hours per day and forty-four hours per week, and requiring private
employment contracts to specify the duration of the employment).
96. Id. at 1225.
97. Id.

98. Id. at 1226.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2016

13

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 18 [2016], No. 1, Art. 1

THE SCHOLAR

14

[Vol. 18:1

sions. Although some of these regulations were progressive and effective, many of them contradicted each other and caused further
problems for labour control.99
This dissatisfaction, stemming from the widespread lack of implementing
changes in the labor conditions of Chinese workplaces, eventually led to
the Chinese government passing the 2008 LCL. 0 0
B.

2008 Labor Contract Law

In the early 2000s, the Chinese government began to formulate new
reforms for the labor system in place because it determined that the 1994
Labor Law was inadequate to protect the workers of China.'o' In response to the protests, dissatisfaction, and reports of child labor,1 0 2 the
Standing Committee of the NPC convened on June 29, 2007 to reform the
law.' 03 The meeting ultimately resulted in the enactment of the 2008
LCL-a law that has continued to increase the number of long-term labor contracts (ideally equating to more stability for workers).104 The
2008 law echoes some of the 1994 Labor Law concepts, but further details
the negotiating power rights of the employee. 0 5

99.

LAN & PICKLES, supra note 91.
100. See Hang, supra note 92, at 1227-28 (discussing the legislative changes to China's
Employment Law in 2008: Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, Employment

Promotion Law, and Labor Contract Law).
101. See Monique Garcia, China's Labor Law Evolution: Towards a New Frontier, 16
ILSA J. INT'L & CoMiP. L. 235, 237 (2009) (listing reasons why the 1994 Labor Law was
ineffective at reducing employee exploitation). The laws and rules under the 1994 system
were implemented by each local government, which led to confusion and inadequate exe-

cution. Id. The 1994 law was seen as voluntary by the very groups it was supposed to be
enforced against. Id.; see also LAN & PICKLES, supra note 91 (explaining the reasons behind the dissatisfaction with the old law and support for reforming it). The 1994 law failed
to address all aspects of contract formation (focusing solely on termination), was overly
vague and open to exploitative interpretation, and did not address all forms of employment. Id.
102. See Garcia, supra note 101, at 238 (discussing labor protests which led to the
passage of the 2008 LCL. One incident in particular caused the Standing Committee to
quickly and resolutely pass the 2008 LCL: "In the Shanxi and Henan provinces, police
freed nearly 600 workers held as slave laborers, many of them being children." Id.
103. Jian & Peiyong, supra note 6, at 72.
104. See id. (describing the growing trend, beginning in 2008, of increasing labor contracts for a duration for more than one year).
105. See Hang, supra note 92, at 1232 (highlighting the 2008 LCL took general concepts from the 1994 Labor Law, but made implementation of the law more specific and
clear). The LCL defined certain terms ("fixed-term" and "open-ended") and enforced
more specific restrictions on employers, including the requirement that employment contracts "contain terms pertaining to work hours, rest breaks, vacation hours, wages, and
occupational health and safety standards." Id.
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The LCL has made strong advances in several highly contentious areas
from the original 1994 Labor laws. 106 Specifically, the law requires labor
enforcement provisions to be handled by the labor administrative department of the State Council.' Additionally, another important section of
the new law requires employers to stipulate a probation period with a
sliding scale depending on the length of the contract.' This is intended
to favor employees because it reduces the period of time during which
conflicts over the labor contract arise (which favored the employer).109
By adding specific provisions preventing employers from paying less than
minimum wage or firing employees without cause, the Standing Committee sought to prevent employers within China from exploiting "upwardly
mobile and aspiring young, skilled workers." 1 o
Stated as being an attempt to "institute and further a harmonious relationship between employers and employee," President Hu Jintao likened
the 2008 law to the "Long March" of Mao Tsedong during the civil
war."' This law was touted as a success against both internal and external opposition, however, it also effectively weakened China's position
12
with Foreign Investment Enterprises (FIEs).'
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS OF CHINESE LABOR LAW

The Effectiveness of the 2008 Labor Contract Law

The LCL is heralded as a "clear retreat from the broad deference given
to employers under the 1994 Labor Law."' 13 It prescribes minimum conditions for workers: a forty-four hour work week, overtime pay, acknowl-

106. See generally LAN & PICKLES, supra note 91 (concluding the LCL, generally, was
a trend away from employer-centric section under the 1994 Labor Law).
[Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of
l
107.
China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., June 29, 2007, effective
July 1, 2013) art. 73, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=6133&lib=law&SearchKeyword=
labor%20Contract%2OLaw%200f%20the%2OPeople%27s%20Republic%200f%20China

&SearchCKeyword=.
108. Id. at art. 19. "If the term of a labor contract is not less than 3 months but less
than 1 year, the probation period shall not exceed one month." Id. If the term is between
1 and 3 years, the "probation period shall not exceed two months." Id. If the labor contract is greater than 3 years, the probation period shall not exceed 6 months. Id.
109. See LAN & PICKLES, supra note 91 (explaining under the vague provisions of the
1994 Labor Law, employers could exploit employees during the probation period without
sufficient protections in place for those employees).
110. See id. (stating reforms in higher education in the 1990s led to more young skilled
workers getting jobs and subsequently being exploited).
111. Garcia, supra note 101, at 238.
112. See generally id. at 239-40 (discussing the LCL was a success at advancing employee rights, but adversely affected the profitability and viability of foreign interests).
113. Ho, supra note 2, at 69.
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edgement of leave and holidays, and the requirement for employers to
regularly and fully pay the minimum wage set by local authorities." 4 The
terms in the LCL focus less on "mobility within the workforce" and more
on job security based on clearer contracts between employers and
employees.' 1 5

The LCL specifically addresses contract terms between employers and
employees, and" 6 also enables employees to collectively bargain for
these contracts."' The law is enforced at the local level by the Communist governments within each province." 8 As such, local governments
are required to solicit opinions from labor unions regarding the state of
the labor contract system,"9 however, there is only one legally recognized
labor union in China, the ACFTU.' 2 0
The language in Article 10 of the LCL explicitly states that a written
labor contract shall be established between the employer and employee
at the outset of the relationship or within one month of work commencing.' 2 ' The language also stipulates that employers are granted a one
month probationary period at the beginning of the relationship when employers can refrain from entering into written contracts with their employees.' 2 2 Contracts under the law are classified as either fix-term
contracts, non-fixed term contracts, or contracts set up for the duration of
specific tasks.12 3 In the event that compensation or any other provisions
are omitted, the employer and employee will defer to the relevant provisions in the collective contract with the company.1 24 If there is no collec-

114. Louise W. Floyd, When Old Meets New: Some Perspectives on Recent Chinese
Legal Developments and Their Relevance to the United States (The Importance of Labor

Law), 64 SMU L.

REV.

1209, 1215 (2011).

115. Ho, supra note 2, at 69.
116. See generally
A
[Labor Contract Law of the People's
Republic of China] art. 1-2.
117. See id. at art. 4 (describing the general provisions of the employer/employee
contracts).
118. See id. at art. 30, 54, 55, 73, 74 (describing the responsibilities of local and county
level labor departments to supervise and inspect the implementation of labor contracts).
119. Id. at art. 41, 43, 73, 78.
120. See Stanley Lubman, China's Continuing Labor Problems, WALL Sr. J. (Sept. 27,
2010, 5:42 PM HKT), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2010/09/27/chinaE2%80%99scontinuing-labor-problems/ (describing the sectors and tensions at play in Chinese society).
121.
AR-2J
(2012 P1E) [Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (2012 Amendment)] at art. 10.
122. Jian & Peiyong, supra note 6, at 73.
123.
AM
j
IJ
(2012 ft1IE) [Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (2012 Amendment)] art. 12-15.
124. Id. at art. 18.
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tive contract, then the "principle of equal pay for equal work shall be
observed." 1 2 5
Under the LCL, fixed-term contracts stipulate the duration of the employer-employee relationship.12 6 A non-fixed term contract is the default
form that will bind the employee and employer.1 2 7 Non-fixed term contracts are contracts where employer and employee do not stipulate an
end time for the contract, and can occur when: (1) employees have
worked for the employer for ten years; (2) when employees have worked
for the employer for ten years consecutively prior to the employer's
adoption of the labor contract system; or (3) when a year has lapsed since
the employee began to work for the employer.1 28
Under the LCL, the Chinese government specifically designates the labor administrative department of the State Council as the entity responsible for implementing the labor contract system. 12 9 Beyond that, it falls to
local governments to supervise and inspect the enforcement of the labor
contract system within their respective jurisdictions.1 3 0 In order to accomplish this, Article 73 of the LCL states that these local governments
"shall solicit the opinions of the labor unions, enterprise representatives,
and relevant industrial administrative departments."'3 1 Since the only labor union legally recognized in China is the ACFTU, which is a legal arm
of the central government of China,1 3 2 the only representatives that could
potentially proffer the opinions mandated by Article 73 to local governments are either government labor representatives or representatives of
the very companies that could potentially be violating workers' rights.
The LCL imposes harsh penalties against employers who violate employees' rights. Employers are obligated to pay employees no less than
the local minimum wage.' 3 3 If an employer fails to conclude written contracts with employees "after the lapse of more than one month but less
than one year as of the day when it started using him," the employer may
be liable to the employee for double the monthly wages owed.1 3 4 If an
employer compels employees to work excessive overtime, threatens em-

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at art. 11.
at art. 13.
at art. 14.
at art. 73.

130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Jedidiah J. Kroncke, Property Rights, Labor Rights and Democratization: Lessons from China and Experimental Authoritarians, 46 N.Y.U. J. INTLi L. & Poi. 115, 162

(2013).

(2012
i)I
133. cpg rgitln
public of China (2012 Amendment)] art. 72.
134. Id. at art. 82.
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ployees with violence, commands employees to perform dangerous tasks,
implements corporal punishment, or damages the physical or mental
health of any employee, the employer may be subject to administrative
punishment and or criminal liability."'
According to the International Labour Organization, the Chinese
workforce consists of a maximum 48 hour work week.1 36 There is extensive proof, however, that many manufacturing companies not only force
workers to exceed the maximum, but also fail to pay these workers adequately for additional time.'3 7 Unfortunately, the effectiveness of imposing the penalties set forth in the LCL is contingent upon the enforcement
of local governments.13 The localized approach problem is evidenced by
the exploitation of workers at corporate factories such as Foxconn and
Pegatron. 3 9

135. Id. at art. 88.

136. INT'L LAB. ORG., WORKING CONDITIONS LAWS REPORT 2012: A GLOBAL REVIEw, at 5, 12 (2013), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--ed-protect/--protrav/
-- travail/documents/publication/wcms_235155.pdf.
137. See generally CHINA LABOR WATCH, ANALYZING LABOR CONDITIONS OF PEGATRON AND FOXCONN: APPLE's Low-Cos-r REALITY, at 14 (2015) [hereinafter APPLE'S
Low-CosT REALITY], http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/upfile/2015_0211 /Analyzing%20
Labor%20Conditions%20of%20Pegatron%20and%20Foxconn-vF.pdf
("Research of
Pegatron's workers' pay stubs reveals average of 60+ working hours per week, 52% of
workers completed more than 90 hours of overtime per month, even working as many as
132 hours of overtime."); CHINA LABOR WATCH, APPLE'S UNKEPT PROMISES: CHEAP
IPHONES COME AT HIGH COSTS TO CHINESE WORKERS, at 1 (2013) [hereinafter CHEAP
IPHONES COME AT HIGH COSTS TO CHINESE WORKERS], http://www.chinalaborwatch.org
upfile/2013_7_29/apple-s-unkept-promises.pdf (concluding workers at Pegatron get paid
less than half of the local monthly income of Shanghai, which forces employees to work
excessive overtime to make ends meet); CHINA LABOR WATCH, Two YEARS OF BROKEN
PROMISES: INVESTIGATIVE REPORT OF CATCHER TECHNOLOGY Co. LTD (SUQIAN), AN
APPLE PARTS MANUFACTURER, at 6, 7, 13 (2014) [hereinafter Two YEARS OF BROKEN
PROMISES], http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/upfile/2014_- 09 04/2014.09.02_SuqianCatcher
_FINALPDFUPDATE.pdf ("Workers [at Catcher Technology Co., Ltd] are not allowed
to choose if they want to work overtime or not."); CHINA LABOUR BULLETIN, SWIMMING
AGAINST THE

TIDE: A

SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CONFLICTS IN CHINA AND TIE GOVERN-

16 (2010) [hereinafter SWIMMING AGAINST THE
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/File/research-reports/Labour%20Conflict%20Report
%20final.pdf (recounting results from surveys taken in the 200s revealing the amount of

MENT'S ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL IT, at
TIDE],

migrant workers who were without contracts and forced to work overtime without pay).
I
(2012 ftiE [Labor Contract Law of the People's Re138.

public of China (2012 Amendment)] art. 74.
139. See generally APPLE'S Low-CosT REALITY, supra note 137, at 6, 16, 18 (reporting
on Apple affiliate's excessive overtime with no compensation); CHEAP IPHONES COME AT
HIGH COSTS TO CHINESE WORKERS, supra note 137, at I (reporting on Pegatron's competitive practices for supplying Apple's new iPhone at the cost of working conditions).
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One of the most significant violators of the Chinese LCL is the tech
giant, Apple. 40 The largest violations have occurred at the Apple affiliated plants of Foxconn, Pegatron, and Catcher.1 4 ' Workers at the Pegatron plant in Shanghai have been documented working extremely long
work weeks while averaging monthly earnings below the local average
monthly wage of Shanghai.' 4 2 Apple drove labor costs down between
Foxconn and Pegatron by shifting orders between the two locations.14 3
Specifically, in an effort to resolve the rising labor costs at Foxconn, Apple contracted with Pegatron,1 4 4 a move that resulted in a competitive
race to drive down the cost of labor. Similarly, employees at the Catcher
production plant typically work up to 100 hours of overtime a month,
which is "nearly three times the limit of 36 hours mandated by Chinese
Labor Law."' 45
At a glance, the LCL seems to be an effective means of addressing the
shortcomings of the Chinese labor system, but that is simply a facade.
Policymakers wanted to increase the benefits of labor workers, but realized that in order to do so, labor costs and unemployment would likely
increase.1 4 6 Also, despite the rise in collective contract agreements, there
is clear evidence that many employees still slip through the cracks.147
When collective contracts are negotiated, employees are nearly always
excluded from the negotiating process.1 48 As such, these contracts rarely
reflect the true interests of the employee.1 49

140. See ApPLE's Low-Cos-r

REAIXTY,

supra note 137, at 1, 2 (discussing Apple's la-

bor practices in China).

141. See generally id. at 1, 17 ("Research of Pegatron's workers' pay stubs reveals
average of 60+ working hours per week, 52% of workers completed more than 90 hours of
overtime per month, even working as many as 132 hours of overtime."); Two YEARS OF
BROKEN PROMIsES, supra note 137, at 14 ("Workers [at Catcher Technology Co., Ltd] are
not allowed to choose if they want to work overtime or not."); CHEAP IPI[ONES COME AT
HIGH COSTS TO CHINESE WORKERs, supra note 137, at 1 (concluding workers at Pegatron
get paid less than half of the local monthly income of Shanghai, which forces employees to
work excessive overtime to make ends meet).
142. CHEAP IPHONES COME AT HiGiH COSTS 0 CHINESE WORKERS, supra note 137,
at 1.
143. See A'rei.'s Low-Cosr REALITY, supra note 137, at 4 (describing how Apple
used Pegatron and Foxconn to reduce labor costs).
144. Id.
145. Two YEARS OF BROKEN PROMISES, supra note 137, at 6.
146. AARONSON, supra note 78.
147. See SWIMMING AGAINST TH-IE TIDE supra note 137, at 11, 21 (reporting on the
flaws inherent in China's labor laws versus employer practices).
148. See id. at 11 (reporting on the flaws inherent in China's labor laws versus employer practices).
149. See id. (reporting on the flaws inherent in China's labor laws versus employer
practices).
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Labor unions are supposed to safeguard the interests and rights of
workers while also protecting the overall interests of the country.1 5 0
When a country's GDP-China's was approximately 17.62 trillion dollars
in 2014 (surpassing the United States as the world's largest economy)-is
derived heavily from its manufacturing sector, the interests of labor workers tend to become secondary to that of the state."' As such, labor rights
are outweighed by monetary needs, as such, factories in China continue
to use abusive practices that violate the existing labor law as well as International Labor Organization (ILO) standards.' 52
V.

STATE OF THE CONTEMPORARY LABOR SYSTEM IN CHINA

Since the passage of the 2008 LCL, there is evidence that certain working conditions have improved.' 3 As mentioned, the LCL requires a written contract that must be agreed upon and enforced between the
employer and employee, 5 4 and employers must consult with labor unions and employees before modifying work rules.' 5 5 The increase of bargaining power for employees, however, has led to a rise in labor
disputes.1 56
A.

Decline of the Chinese Labor Industry

In 1993, there were between 12,358 and 34,794 labor disputes heard by
arbitration committees, but in 2011, there were over 589,244 hearings.'
A major factor for this drastic increase is due to the down-turn of the
Chinese economy."' Throughout the early 2000s, China enjoyed double
digit GDP growth. In recent years, however, China's growth has dropped
150. Hang, supra note 92, at 1237.

151. See generally The World Factbook: China, supra note 77 (reporting China's "per
capita income is below the world average" despite its ranking as the world's largest economy, indicating the interest of a single individual comes after that of the State's).
152. Hang, supra note 92, at 1247.
153. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 7.
[Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of
T
0
154.

China] art 10.
155. See LAN & PICKLES, supra note 91 (analyzing China's contract law amidst global
production demands).
156. 2013 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 7. These labor disputes are generally
brought before the labor dispute arbitration committees and have been extremely prevalent since the passage of the Chinese Labor Contract Law. Id.
157. Id.

158. See generally CHINA LAnouii BULTItnN, SEARCHING FOR THE UNION: THE
WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN CHINA 2011-13, at 8 (2013), http://www.clb.org.hklen/sites/default

/files/File/research-reports/searching%20for%20the%20union%201.pdf (generalizing
when the economy began to slow down, manufacturers began to cut labor costs by cutting
pay and benefits).
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1 60
significantly,15 9 causing the manufacturing sector to take a large hit.
During this time, the demand for cheap exports from China was on the
decline,161 while employee wages (up to 50% from 2010-2013)162 and
1 63
land cost was steadily increasing.
As a result of the unstable economy, labor intensive industries such as
toy, shoe and garment manufacturers fled China to find cheaper re64
Electronics comsources in countries like Bangladesh and Cambodia.'
panies were hit equally as hard when companies like Sony, Sharp, and
Panasonic reported losing $5.6 billion, $4.7 billion, and $9.64 billion in
2011, respectively.' 6 5 Some industries rebounded slightly in 2013, but
66
In
much of that progress was dissolved in the June 2013 credit crunch.1
response to the economic hardships, several manufacturers in China
turned to an easier way to "offset their reduced profits by cheating work67
ers out of overtime and cutting back" on certain benefits.1
16 8
In contemporary China, factories still abuse Chinese labor laws.
These violations include overtime violations, unsafe work environments,
and the persistent usage of child labor and intermediaries to avoid comThe most prevalent labor issues involve the demand for
pliance.' 6
higher wages and severance compensation. 7 0

B.

Enforcement of Wages and Compensation

In the event of termination or relocation of the company, the LCL stipulates that employees must receive one month's salary for every year of
service.' 7 ' Evidenced by a report published by the labor watchdog group,

159. Id. at 7.
160. Id.
161. See id. (explaining large buyers in Europe, the United States, and Japan slowed
spending).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 7-8.
166. Id. at 8. The credit crunch was a period of time where many banks nearly ran out
of money in China. Id.
167. Id.
168. Hang, supra note 92, at 1248-53.
169. Id.
170. See SEARCHING FOR THE UNION: THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN CHINA 2011-13,
supra note 158, at 14-15, 30, 33, 38 (discussing protests involving low wages and lack of
severance compensation led by sanitation workers, workers on strike at the Ohms Electronics factory, and workers for state-owned enterprises whose complaints were continually ignored).
171. Id. at 19.
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China Labour Bulletin, 7 2 many employees demand the "market rate" for
severance compensation-a rate that is typically twice the amount of the
mandated rate required by the LCL.17 1 On September 17, 2012, around
6,000 employees in Shanghai went on strike against their employer, Flextronics, in protest against the mandated LCL's offer of severance compensation. 1 7 4 The LCL's severance package became effective because
Flextronics was moving its factory from Shanghai to Suzhou, Jiangsu. 7 5
Employees demanded a similar compensation offer that was given to
management (eight months' salary for every year worked), but negotiations proved to be ineffective1 7 6 The demands seemed reasonable,
largely because their average salary paled in comparison to manufacturing employees in the United States.' 7
Since mid-2010, wages for factory workers in China have increased by
approximately 50%.178 Even with this significant increase, however, the
wages of these workers still equal approximately one fiftieth of the
equivalent wage in the United States. 7 9 Under China's current Five
Year Plan (2011-2015), the minimum wage (set by each locality) "is set to
increase at an average rate of 13% a year and eventually reach 40% of
the average wage in each region."so Unfortunately, these optimistic
numbers are not realistic because pay increases for the manufacturing
sector are falling behind many other higher paying sectors of the Chinese
economy.' 8 1 In fact, in some electronic factories, the minimum wage is so
low that employees have to work extra hours to meet basic monetary
needs.1 82

172.

See generally SEARCHING

FOR THE UNION: Ti-iE WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN CI INA

2011-13, supra note 158, at 8-9 (reporting instances where workers have demanded more
than the mandated amount for compensation).
173. Id. at 19.

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Baogang Guo, China's Labor Standards: Myths and Realities, ACADEMIA, at 5
(Feb. 7, 2003), http://www.academia.edu/165449/China-s_LaborStandardsMyths
andRealities.
178. SEARCHING

FOR

THE-

UNION: TI-IF

WORKERS'

MOVEMENT

IN CHINA

2011-13,

WORKERS'

MOVEMENT

IN CHINA

2011-13,

supra note 158, at 20.
179. Guo, supra note 177, at 5.
180. SEARCHING

FOR

THE UNION: THE

supra note 158, at 20.
181. See id. (alluding to manufacturing pay gains being inferior to those in the financial and technology sectors).
182. CHINA LABOR WATCH, TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION: TiHE TRUTH BEHIND
ELECTRONICS SWEATSHOPS, at 5 (2012), http://www.chinalaborwatch.org/upfile/2011_7 11/

20110712.pdf.
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The Chinese government relies heavily on the effectiveness of the
LCL's localized enforcement provision that empowers local bureaucrats
to execute the law fairly for all Chinese workers.1 s 3 Unfortunately, the
efficacy of the local governments depends heavily on the relationship that
exists "between the workers and the [local] government, the level of disruption caused by the workers' protest[s], and the overall social and economic goals of the local government . ."'84 Local governments vary in
degree regarding the amount of experience in dealing with labor disputes." Traditionally poorer provincial governments, lacking the resources of most of their counterparts, tend to be more "business-friendly"
to attract lucrative business to their provinces.18 6 This can expose workers in those poor provinces at risk for abuse.
The governments of Mudanjiang and Xian, are two examples of poor
governments ignoring complaints of workers in favor of "businessfriendly" policies." In Mudanjiang, the government repeatedly ignored
demands and pleas from thousands of employees at the Hualin Giti Tire
Co.1" "The workers had made 12 written complaints and signed 11 collective petitions to the provincial and municipal government"; and the
government never resolved the issue. 189 The government's failure to acknowledge the issue prompted a public protest on March 26, 2 0 1 2 .90
Since it is a crime to stage protests in China, several workers went to
prison.191 In Xian, several hundred workers from Double Crane Pharmaceutical Co. complained to the provincial government that current wages
were unsuitable to live on, and similarly, the government consistently

[Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of
I
183. See
China] art. 30, 54, 55, 73, 74 (describing the responsibilities of local and county level labor
departments to supervise and inspect the implementation of labor contracts).
184. SEARCHING FOR THE UNION: TiH-E WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN CHINA 2011-13,
supra note 158, at 32.
185. See generally id. at 32-37 (concluding provinces that have more manufacturing
centers, like Guangzhou, have more experience in dealing with labor disputes than other
provinces).
186. See id. at 36-37 (inferring that because provincial governments in poorer provinces tend to "be more overtly business-friendly": governments do what they can to cater
to and attract businesses by ignoring the demands of workers).
187. Id.
188. See id. (relating to the sale of the state-owned Hualin Rubber Factory).
189. Id. at 37.

190. Id.
191. See generally Dana C. Nicholas, China's Labor Enforcement Crisis: International
Intervention and Corporate Social Responsibility, 11 SCHOLAR 155, 167-68 (2009) (stating
the repercussions for organizing include imprisonment, giving workers little ability to organize and demand better working conditions).
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turned their complaints away.1 9 2 Similar to the situation in Mudanjiang,
these workers took to the streets to protest the lack of response to their
complaints."' It is alarming that the only way for factory workers to garner public support for their rights in China, is to break the law and perpetuate the cycle of repressive disregard for the plight of Chinese
workers.
Some local governments tend to favor a neutral approach towards labor disputes." For example, the local government in Guangdong, understanding that most labor disputes stem from relations between factory
workers and management, leaves labor disputes to the employees and
factory owners.1 95 Aside from maintaining a neutral position between
factory workers and owners, local governments also take a stance that
attempts to negotiate concessions from both groups.' 96 However, these
governments are also known for cracking down on groups who promote
labor rights as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that purport to do the same.' 9 7 The government of the Shenzhen province was a
notorious example of this. 98 As part of an intimidation campaign, in
2012, government officials in Shenzhen conducted inspections of several
local NGO offices and subsequently terminated lease agreements and
contracts with the Spring Wind Labour Dispute Service Centre, the
Yuandian Workers' Centre, and the Dagongzhe Migrant Worker Centre.1 99 These government officials have also incessantly questioned labor
activists like Zhang Zhiru and compelled several others to move.20 0
VI.
A.

ANALYZING THE ACFTU AND ITS LOCAL LABOR UNIONS

Effectiveness of the All-China Federationof Trade Unions

In political theory, it is widely believed that trade unions provide a
counterbalance between government power and business interests that
192.

SEARCIllNG FOR THE UNION: Ti-E_ WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN CHINA

2011-13,

supra note 158, at 37.

193. Id.
194. Id. at 32. This is typically for privately-owned and foreign-owned factories. Id.

195. Id.
196. Id.

197. Id. at 35.
198. See id. at 35-36 (reporting the Shenzhen government has repeatedly harassed

and intimidated the labor rights groups and other NGOs supporting workers).
199. Id.

200. See Alexandra Harney, China labor activists say facing unprecedented intimidation, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 2015, 12:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/21/uschina-labour-idUSKBNOKUl3V20150121. The police of Shenzhen were able to inhibit
Zhang's labor advocacy activities by telling his landlords that he was a "politically problematic tenant." Id.
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exist in our contemporary globalized society. 20 ' Through the spread of
globalization and the business-centric policies that come with it, trade unions in China have been unable to provide this aforementioned balance. 20 2 To run effectively, trade unions require certain political
liberties. 2 0 3 These liberties include free speech, the right to assemble, and
the right to have grievances addressed. 204 These political liberties also
run hand-in-hand with specific labor standards, 205 including the right to
join a union of one's own choice, to organize, to bargain, and, to strike, if
necessary. 206 However, as discussed above, the presence of an effective
trade union structure is sorely lacking in countries like China.20 7
In recent years, China's economic policy has been to assimilate with the
world economy while maintaining tight control of its workforce. 2 0 8 Specifically, its policy towards trade unionism has been a crucial element of
this inherent struggle. 20 9 In contemporary China, there is only one legally recognized union: the ACFTU.2 10 Originating in the 1920s, the
ACFTU predated the PPC.2 1' Due to the rise of the CCP, in 1949, the
ACFTU fell under state control.2 1 2 As such, the ACFTU is "simply a
creature of the Chinese state and the Communist Party." 2 13 The communist government adopted a "corporatist approach" to the management of
the ACFTU and labor.2 14 This strategy assumed that the interests of the
state and workers were inherently aligned. 2 15 This notion did not sit well
with the leaders of the ACFTU, which ultimately led to their eventual
purge shortly after the rise of the CCP. 2 1 6
Since the ACFTU's reorganization in 1978, the union now represents
over 250 million workers, 2 1 7 and exists at every level of Chinese govern-

201. Stephen F. Diamond, The "Race to the Bottom" Returns: China's Challenge to the
International Labor Movement, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'I Pol.y 39, 55 (2003).

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 55.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

208. Id. at 55-56.
209. See id. at 55 (stating China's approach to economic policy in the midst of globalization undermines trade unions' ability to counter the government's power).
210. Kroncke, supra note 132, at 162.
211. Id.

212. Id.
213. Diamond, supra note 201, at 55.
214. Kroncke, supra note 132, at 162.

215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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ance. 218 Current law prohibits workers from independently organizing, 2 19 and any attempt to do so can lead to incarceration. 2 20 This leaves
the ACFTU as the only option for workers' rights to be heard.2 21 The
only organization (which is government-controlled) that represents workers cannot effectively demand better working conditions because of political constraints.22 2 Coupled with a firewall preventing the free exchange
of information online,2 23 there has been relatively little national outcry
from workers:
[s]ince an average Chinese worker faces imprisonment for organizing
trade groups, there is very little upheaval from workers in rural Chinese factories at this point in time. These workers are poor and in
need of the little income they make from working in Chinese factories. Working class children are particularly vulnerable because
often they are needed to assist in providing for their families. Thus,
without incentive or opportunity for workers to organize, factory
owners are able to exploit child labor to increase output of goods. 2 2 4
The need for income seems to be a larger incentive for the average
worker in China than risking everything in trying to improve their environment. 2 2 5 This is especially true for migrant workers. 2 2 6 These workers leave their lives in rural China to seek better pay in manufacturing
centers in urban areas.22 7 Their migratory nature, however, has made it
1 218. See id. (outlining the governing structure of the ACFTU). There are thirty-one
regional federations of the ACFTU. Id. These exist at the "provincial, prefectural, county
and township levels." Id. Furthermore, there are over one million grassroots local unions.
Id.
219. Nicholas, supra note 191, at 167; Diamond, supra note 201, at 55; Toby D.
Merchant, Recognizing ILO Rights to Organize and Bargain Collectively; Grease in China's
Transition to a Socialist Market Economy, 36 CASE W. REgs. J. INT'L L. 223, 224 (2004).
220. Nicholas, supra note 191, at 168; Merchant, supra note 220, at 224; Diamond,
supra note 201, at 55.
221. Nicholas, supra note 191, at 167-68.

222. Id.
223. Park, supra note 75.
224. Nicholas, supra note 191, at 168.
225. Id. at 174. See generally PROTECTING WORKERs' RIGirrS OR SERVING TI-IE
PARTY: THE WAY FORWARDI FOR CHINA'S TRADE UNIONS, supra note 9 at 30 (explaining
"joint rights protection initiatives" led by local union is not within the means of moth living
in underdeveloped regions).
226. See PROTECTING WORKERS' RIGhiTS OR SERVING THE PArUy: Ti-HE WAY FORWARD FOR CIIINA'S TRADE UNIONS, supra note 9, at 27-28 (asserting migrant workers are
an exceptionally disadvantaged and exploited group of workers that do not assert their
rights out of fear of losing their jobs).
227. Nicholas, supra note 191, at 174 n.89 (quoting David Barboza, Reform Stalls in
Chinese Factories, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 5. 2008, at Cl).
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incredibly difficult for the ACFT'U to address even their most basic demand-"decent pay for decent work." 22 8
In the contemporary ACFTU, virtually all of the leadership at the national and regional levels is made up of CCP members. 2 2 9 The ACFTU
Chairman is a member of the Political Bureau, and most of the grassroots
union leaders are themselves "enterprise managers with strong ties to the
interests of the local business community." 23 0 These local union leaders
are typically appointed or run unopposed in union elections. 23 1 The leadership of this organization, at all levels, seems to have a significant conflict of interests between the communist government, local businesses,
and the workers that these leaders purport to protect. 232 The labor leaders in local enterprises "are dependent on management, and very often
union leaders have close ties with management, compromising their ability to effectively represent workers."2 3 3
With the ACFTU's incorporation into the CCP, its apparent role is to
broadcast labor policy instead of representing workers. 2 34 As a result,
much of that responsibility has fallen to the discretion of the local union
leaders. 235 These local ACFTU leaders, with local business ties, have virtually full discretion as to how workers are represented.2 36 In fact, the
ACFTU seems to occasionally condemn the "rank-and-file" attempts to
secure jobs, benefits, and pensions in favor of business interests. 2 37
In 1997, the ACFTU proudly stated that trade unions were re-vamping
efforts by "mounting vigorous campaigns to educate workers on the international labour standards and actively participating in the legislation
work of the government." 2 3 8 In more recent years, however, the positivism of the campaign in the 1990's has reached a stalemate.2 39 In addition,
228.

FOR

PROTEcrING WORKERS' Ric-rrs OR SERVING TIF PARTY:
CIINA'S TRADE UNIONS, supra note 9, at 28-29.

TUin

WAY

FORWARI)

229. Kroncke, supra note 132, at 163.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See id. ("As a result of [the] embedded relationship within the CCP, the corporatist role of the ACFTU has been to transmit labor policy rather than represent workers'
interests.").
233. Conflicts of interests and the ineffectiveness of China's labour laws, CHINA LAn3OUR Bui .1TIN (Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.clb.org.hklen/?q=node/50375.
234. Kroncke, supra note 132, at 163.

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Diamond, supra note 201, at 55-56.
238. Chinese Trade Unions Actively Push Forward the Application of International
Labour Standards, ACFTU (Dec. 10, 1997), http://english.acftu.org/template/10002/
file.jsp?cid=69&aid=34.
239. See generally SEIARCHING FOR ITHE UNION TIE WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN CHINA
2011-13, supra note 158, at 37 ("[The ACFTU] has spent much of the last three years mired
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the ACFTU has also been described as a "lost cause. . . out of touch with
the realities of labour relations in China today." 2 4 0 A government-controlled entity that is
[f]ar from supporting democratic and free trade unionism, [and its]
[ ] [ ] central purpose is to carry out State and Party directives and to
do everything it can to insure that all workers fall into line as well. 2 4 1
The ACFTU has not been able to provide a reasonable and effective
framework for local trade unions to enforce.24 2 Traditionally, the
ACFTU does not have a collective bargaining role.2 43 Coupled with the
fact that all other forms of independent labor organization are banned, it
is clear that the ACFTU does not fully represent the interests of the
workers.24 4 Further, restrictions have been placed on independent trade
unions by law to "prevent any workers' collective action 2 from
growing
45
into 'anything long-term, programmatic, or institutional."'
Historically, labor unrest in China has been underreported,2 46 and any
effort to galvanize widespread labor action has been stamped out by the
government firewall. 247 Internet usage has steadily risen in China.2 48 It
has been recognized that communication, especially through the Internet,

in inactivity .

.

. incapable of breaking free of its traditional bureaucratic mind-set and

actually do something to help the workers."). This is evidenced by the ACFTU's work
plan for the years 2011 to 2013, which focused on two key tasks that had been outlined in a
2010 speech by the then chairman Wang Zhaoguo: namely to "encourage all enterprises to
establish trade unions according to the law," and to "encourage all enterprises to hold
collective wage negotiations according to the law." Id.
240. Id. at 38.
241. Diamond, supra note 201, at 58.

242.

SEARCIllNG FOR THE UNION TIE WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN CIllNA 2011-13, supra

note 158, at 38.
243. Kroncke, supra note 132, at 165.
244. Id. "Instead, the CCP has used the ACFTU to negotiate broad contractual minimums in certain geographic areas and industries to attempt to further its vision of industrial relations." Id.
245. Stanley Lubman, A Shot at Solving China's Angry Worker Problem, WALL Sr. J.
(Feb. 26, 2015, 2:26 PM HKT), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2015/02/26/a-shot-atsolving-chinas-angry-worker-problem (quoting expert, Mary Gallagher, from the Univer-

sity of Michigan).
246. Kroncke, supra note 132, at 166.
247. See generally Park, supra note 75 (emphasizing China actively suppresses mass
media that it deems to have a substantial negative impact on the government or the country as a whole).
248. See Euan McKirdy, China'sonline users more than double entire U.S. population,
CNN (Feb. 4, 2015, 12:24 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/03/world/china-internetgrowth-2014/ (stating China has the world's largest and fastest growing number of internet
users).
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will be key to any substantial labor reform in China. 24 9 The argument
could be made that this increased usage has increased the exposure of
labor disputes to the Chinese public, but the sophisticated "Great Firewall" of China prevents any widespread access of potentially "destabilizing" elements to society.2 50
B.

Specific Instances Where the ACFTU was Inadequate

There have been several labor disputes at some of China's largest manufacturing plants, including the incident at Foxconn, the world's largest
25
producer of contract electronics: 1
In January and February of 2012, hundreds of workers dramatically
threatened collective suicide at Foxconn. Foxconn, China's largest
private sector employer, produces a staggering 40% of the world's
electronic[ ] goods but is best known for its close relationship with
Apple and as a key supplier for Microsoft.25 2
It was reported that Foxconn forced employees to work an extreme
number of overtime hours. 2 53 This resulted in many deaths directly related to overwork and work-related exhaustion.2 54 According to the secretary of the ACFTU's secretariat, Guo Jun, private companies like
Foxconn had employees working over 10 hours a day without days off. 2 5 5
These work conditions were caused, in part, by the high-pressure working
environment imposed on these employees as a result of large orders from
foreign companies like Apple.25 6 As noted by Professor Chang Kai, Fox-

249. See World Report 2014: China, HUMAN RIGirTs WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/
world-report/2014/country-chapters/china-and-tibet (last visited Sept. 14, 2015) (stating in-

ternet users are aggressively calling for political reform despite restrictions on internet
usage).
250. See generally Park, supra note 75 (discussing with Professor Xiao Qiang, that
Chinese authorities, though unable to completely keep the public in the dark about protests, can shut down forums where public discussion can take place).
251. See Kroncke, supra note 132, at 166 ("[S]ince the mid-1990s [labor unrest] has
generally increased at a rate of 25% a year.").

252. Id.
253. Zhang Xiang, Foxconn's long hours causing workers' deaths: Union, CINA
DAILY, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-02/03/content_1 9477082.htm (last updated Feb. 4, 2015, 10:20 PM).

254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.; see Keira Lu Huang & Lawrence Chung, Chinese trade union slams Taiwan
tech giant Foxconn for 'overworking' staff, Sou-ru CHINA MORNING PosT (Feb. 4, 2015,
10:20 AM), http://www.scmp.com/print/news/china/article/1700269/chinas-official-tradeunion-criticises-electronics-maker-foxconn (reporting 74.5 million iPhones were sold after
the newest model was released in 2010, a "[tjall order even for big suppliers like
Foxconn").
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conn does not have a union chosen by the workers.25 7 One would assume
that Foxconn's presence on the world's manufacturing stage would be
enough to take extra precautionary measures to ensure that its workers
are adequately protected. Difficulty in enforcing labor union laws likely
occurs because many trade unions that exist within private enterprises are
considered "fake unions," "existing in name only but without any real
power." 2 58

As predicted, the events at Foxconn directly caused several other major
strikes across China. 2 59 According to Paul Tang, chief economist of Bank
of East Asia in Hong Kong, "[a]ll it takes now is a single spark and news
will spread all over China, which could lead to similar industrial action in
other factories." 26 0 There is a growing trend of public labor strikes
against major manufacturers, 2 6 ' but these represent only a small fraction
of the labor unrest in China.2 62
Stemming from the ACFTU's inability to establish effective policies,
local trade unions are left with little guidance.2 63 Some of these smaller
trade unions have found success, but these successful interventions in labor disputes are few and far between. 2 6 Specifically, trade unions in the
provinces of Shenzhen and Guangzhou have at least made attempts to
protect workers' rights. 2 65 The Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions organized elections for union representatives in Shenzhen to push for
higher wages and better benefits,26 6 however, it was later reported that
not only did the elections not take place, but violations of workers' rights

257. Huang & Chung, supra note 256; see also Kroncke, supra note 132, at 166 (discussing FoxConn's size and market share).
258. Conflicts of interests and the ineffectiveness of China's labour laws, supra note

233.
259. Peter Foster, China Faces Waves of Strikes After Foxconn Pay Rise, TELEGRAPH
(June 10, 2010, 4:56 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/china-business/7818406/
Workers went on strike at a
China-faces-wave-of-strikes-after-Foxconn-pay-rise.html.
complex operated by Brother, a Japanese sewing machine manufacturer, Honda, and a
Tawainese-owned machinery company. Id.

260. Id.
261. Kroncke, supra note 132, at 167.

262. Id.
263. See

generally SEARCHING FOR THE UNION: THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN CHINA

2011-13, supra note 158, at 44 (emphasizing that since there was no central enforcement
mechanism in place when the strike at the Citizen Watch factory failed, the trade union
had to hire the Guangdon Laowei Law Firm to resolve the issue).
264. See generally id. at 38-39 (asserting attempts to intervene in labor disputes usually only staves off the issue for a few months or does not conclude anything at all).
265. See generally id. (discussing high-profile trade union interventions in Shenzhen
and Guangzhou for the purpose of initiating solutions for long standing labor issues).

266. Id. at 38.
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still existed;2 67 therefore, the attempt to intervene was illusory. A similar
attempt was made in Guangzhou by the Guangzhou Federation of Trade
Unions Chairman, Chen Weiguang.2 6 8 Weiguang publicly pushed for
companies to pay their obligations (wages and social insurance) to employees as well as to ensure that the basic rights of workers were protected. 2 6 9 Beyond these provinces, there has been little reported action
of other provincial trade unions acting on behalf of workers' rights.2 70
VII.

GLOBALIZATION'S NEGATIVE EFFECT ON CHINESE
WORKERS' RIGHTS

As stated by the labor watchdog organization, China Labor Watch, the
abuse that exists in the labor system are "firmly entrenched in the global
supply chain." 27 ' The system of globalization has allowed multi-national
corporations, like Apple, to benefit greatly with large profit margins.2 72
They accomplish these profit margins by placing their production facilities in countries that have cheap sources of labor. 2 7 3 This globalization
benefit is in danger because of the provisions in the LCL that increase
labor costs in China by compelling companies to conclude contracts with
full-time employees, increased severance pay, and "tighter" regulations
concerning the dispatch of labor.27 4

267. Id. at 38-39. In 2013, students went undercover at several factories in Shenzhen
and discovered widespread violations of labor laws in addition to the workers not fully
understanding what a union was and who the representatives were. Id.
268. Id. at 39.
269. Id. In 2012, the Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions also pushed for the
protection of basic rights for the sanitation workers in Guangzhou, who had protested five
times over low pay and insubstantial benefits. Id. In 2013, it responded to the firing of five
employees at an American company, International Paper, by launching an investigation.
Id.
270. See id. at 40 (reporting there was only one other instance of successful intervention, during the Yanlian SOE dispute in Shaanxi). The provincial union in Shaanxi set up a
working group to investigate state-owned enterprise companies. Id. The vice-chairman of
the Shaanxi Federation, Gu Dongwu, stated that "As state-owned enterprises, they should
also shoulder their social responsibilities, set an example, strictly comply with national labour laws and regulations, and actively safeguard workers' legitimate rights and interests."
Id.
271. TRAGEDIES OF GLOnALIZATION: TIIE TRUTH BEIHNi) EIeIoNics SWEATsitors, supra note 182, at 12.
272. See id. at 12-13 (describing the retail price of electronics, like an iPhone ($600),
as being far greater than the cost to manufacturer the components ($187.51) and assemble
the final product ($6.45) by outsourcing to foreign manufacturers).
273. Id. at 107.
274. See generally Garcia,supra note 101, at 241, 249 (highlighting the effects that the
LCL's requirements for improved working conditions will have on the global market, especially China's rising labor costs).
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Some scholars have claimed that Western companies have begun to initiate positive change to the labor issues that exist in countries like
China. 275 This does not excuse, nor should it negate the fact that multinational corporations, like Apple, have been at the center of the labor
issues for years.27 6 Many of the FIEs fear the provisions that pertain to
non-fixed term employment contracts. 2 7 7 Unlike at-will employees in the
United States, which can be terminated for any or no cause, Chinese nonfixed term employees may be terminated only for good cause and must
be given severance pay. 278 Although the LCL authorizes fixed-term contracts279-Contracts that terminate after a certain period of time-provisions provided in the LCL entitle workers to severance pay. 280
Theoretically, this creates issues for foreign companies wanting a flexible
workforce.2 81
Foreign companies are both negatively and positively affected by the
LCL's provisions.2 82 Even though the LCL requires employers to close
contracts with employees, there has not been a harmonious national interpretation or execution of the law in China.2 83 In many respects, the
LCL is vague and leads to animosity and distrust between employees,
labor unions, and employers. 2 84 Within the civil law system of the PRC,
the central government must issue guiding interpretations for the laws
since their courts do not adhere to the common law principle of stare
decisis.285 Because the central government has been late on issuing guiding opinions, local provincial governments have had to implement their

275. See Nicholas, supra note 191, at 178 (discussing China and its foreign manufac-

turers' efforts to improve labor conditions by entering into international agreements and
adopting codes of conduct in factories).
276. Id. See generally TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZA-rION: THE TiRu-Hiji B131NI) EueC-fRONICS SwEATlSHOPs, supra note 182, at 12-13 (asserting large corporations like Apple
and Microsoft's pre-negotiating of materials, which lock in their profits, have left the Chinese workers vulnerable because factories can only reduce costs by cutting wages, not negotiation for cheaper materials); Foster, supra note 259 (asserting the events which
occurred at Foxconn were directly caused by extreme production quotas imposed upon
Foxconn by large corporations).
277. Garcia, supra note 101, at 243.
278. Id. at 243-44.
279. Id. at 243.
280. Id. at 243-44.
281. See id. at 244 (explaining employees can execute fixed-term contracts but can
only conclude two contracts consecutively).
282. See generally id. at 247-49 (arguing the LCL provides loopholes for foreign corporations, but it also raises labor costs for foreign corporations).
283. Id. at 247-48.
284. See Id. at 247 (concluding the lack of interpretation in new LCL has resulted in
confusion between employers, local governments, attorneys, and trade unions).
285. Id.
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own makeshift guiding opinions. 28 6 This furthers the lack of uniformity
and widens the loopholes within the LCL system.28 7
There are over 570,000 FLEa in China. 2 88 They employ around 28 million workers and are mainly located along the coastal regions of China.2 89
With the implementation of the LCL, labor laws are more consistent and
the overall workforce is better paid. 2 9 0 As a result, several FIEs relocated to countries with a cheaper labor force,29 1 including Olympus Corp.
and Yue Yuen Industrial Ltd.2 92 The remaining FIEs in China, especially
those requiring larger workforces, labor costs continue to rise under the
LCL's regime. 293
One scholar believes the rising labor costs in China will "balance" the
equitable treatment of Chinese workers by narrowing the trade imbalance that exists between China and the rest of the world.29 4 With the
rising costs of labor stemming from the enforcement of the LCL, Chinese-made products will no longer have a significant advantage over
goods made in other countries.29 5 Since much of the manufacturing capability in the world rests in China, this could have an indirect effect on
instilling labor law reform in neighboring countries. 29 6 However, this
scholar relies heavily on the premise that all of the LCL is equally enforced throughout the PRC. 29 7 With the local provinces taking it upon
themselves to issue guiding opinions, there is no harmonious execution of
the law; 2 9 8 therefore, the optimism portrayed by the scholar is misplaced.

286. Id. at 248.
287. Id. at 247-48 (concluding the new LCL has not been thoroughly interpreted by
the PRC government legal body, therefore confusing FIEs operating in the PRC).

288. Id. at 248.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 249.
291. Id.
292. Id. These companies shifted some of their production to Vietnam. Id.

293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Cf id. (arguing China's dominance in the manufacturing market will inevitably
have an impact on other countries, leading to greater wealth amongst workers; therefore,
creating a larger consumer base for American companies "looking for new markets in
which to sell their products").

296. Id.
297. See id. at 247 (2009) (relying on "most observers[']" belief that "employees'
rights are extensively increased" under the LCL).
298. See Id. at 248 (stating the lack of a central enforcement mechanism has compelled local governments to implement their own with varying degrees of effectiveness).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2016

33

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 18 [2016], No. 1, Art. 1

THE SCHOLAR

34

[Vol. 18:1

Electronics manufacturers have been major violators of the LCL.2 99
This has been documented by China Labor Watch since the unfortunate
May 2010 incident at Foxconn.3 00 China Labor Watch determined that
these manufacturers engaged in a de facto "race-to-the-bottom" because
they found that Foxconn was actually one of the better workplaces present among other electronics manufacturers.o' This "race-to-the-bottom" strategy stems from increased production orders from companies
like Apple and Samsung.30 2 In addition to the vast number of orders
needed to be filled, the velocity of these production orders adds strain on
these manufacturers and the people that work at these facilities.303 In an
age where technology is consistently improving and changing, the constant pressure to fill orders compels manufacturers to put production
before employees' rights.30 4
Foreign companies have implemented codes of conduct at their facilities in China. 0 s One could reason that these codes of conduct indicate
that workers are looked after by these companies, but this practice is
"contradictory." 3 0 6 Hand in hand with these codes of conduct is the intense pressure that these foreign companies place on the local manufacturing plants to meet their orders. 307 In order to maximize their own
profit margins, these manufacturing plants exploit their workers and cut
their pay. 308 For countries such as China, whose economy relies heavily
on the manufacture and export of cheap goods, there is an inherent disincentive to enforce its own labor laws. 309 If they effectively enforce the

299. See

TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION: THE TiRuri BEi-HIND ELECRONICS SWEAT-

si-lors, supra note 182, at 12 (reporting on the labor and human rights violations inside
Chinese electronics manufacturing plants).

300.
301.
302.
303.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.

304. See id. (implying the quick turnaround for technology corporations' upgrades
equates to more pressure put on the local manufacturers and the workers that put the
products together).
305. Nicholas, supra note 191, at 178.

306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See

TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION: THE TRUTH BEHIND EIcroNIcs SWEAT-

siors, supra note 182, at 13 (reporting on multi-national corporations' ability to circumvent strict labor laws in their own countries by outsourcing labor to developing countries
where labor is cheap and laws are not regulated uniformly).
309. See Nicholas, supra note 191, at 179 (explaining that despite international treaties
and obligations, some nations fear enforcing labor laws to protect their citizens will lead to
a loss of large and "lucrative" orders).
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labor laws that exist, they might suffer "a competitive disadvantage with
3 10
other developing nations" with cheaper sources of labor.
To fully understand the culpability of foreign multi-national corporations, China Labor Watch analyzed the "gradual solidification of profit
stratification.""' Up to 75% of electronic products created in China are
produced in a contract manufacturing system.3 12 This gives companies
like Apple leverage over the material that manufacturers use in the production of products like the iPhone.3 13 In 2010, the iPhone 4 sold for
approximately $600.314 Of the $600, approximately $187.51 was used to
purchase manufacturing components.31 Miscellaneous costs involved in
manufacturing totaled $45.95, and only $6.54 went to assembly and labor
costs,31 6 leaving a profit margin of $360.3" Because the purchased materials for production are pre-negotiated with the multi-national corporation, Chinese-based manufacturers can only profit from reducing
miscellaneous costs and the costs of labor.31 This greatly incentivizes
3 19
manufacturers to ignore laws in order to maximize their own profit.
VIII.

A.

CONCLUSION

External Solution: Corporate Social Responsibility

Since the issues pertaining to China's labor system are problematic in a
number of ways-conflict of interests within the ACFTU; systemic effects
of globalization; and the lack of a universally enforced labor law mechanism-the solutions must be broad enough to encompass a large majority
of these problems. Multi-national corporations, particularly electronics
giants like Apple and Samsung, must engage in corporate social responsibility.32 0 They cannot continue to distance themselves from the issue,

310. Id. at 178-79.
311. TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION: THE TRUTH BiEAlND ELECTRONICS SWEATsHoi's, supra note 182, at 12.

312. Id.
313. See id. at 12-13 (suggesting utilizing a contract manufacturing system allows sophisticated corporations like Apple to negotiate extremely favorable conditions for
themselves).
314. Id. at 12.

315. Id.
316. Id. at 13.

317. Id.
318. Id. at 12-13.
319. Id. at 13.
320. See generally Nicholas, supra note 191, at 181 (discussing the growing importance
of corporate social responsibility in global business practices throughout the world).
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blame local manufacturers, and seek countries with cheap and bountiful
labor whenever local labor laws increase the cost of doing business.3 2 1
In addition, national governments where these corporations have their
principle place of business, should pass laws that make it more difficult
for corporations to be mobile enough to freely move from country to
country to take advantage of the workforce and the tax benefits. 3 2 2 Some
large foreign businesses may openly support efforts to "make the world a
better place." 3 2 3 However, what they do behind the scenes is more telling.324 They adopt codes of conduct to show consumers that they care
about working conditions,3 25 but put incredible amounts of pressure on
local manufacturers to meet production quotas.32 6 The superficial efforts
that corporations have made seem to only support the status quo of nonenforcement of labor laws in China because the alternative would raise
labor costs and cut into their profit margins.32 7
In theory, large foreign companies should use their influence to implement the labor standards that already exist, but often times, are ignored
by local governments. 3 2 8 Turning a blind eye to the violations of workers'
rights in China makes these corporations just as culpable by demanding
more from the local manufacturers then evading responsibility for the resulting working conditions. 3 29 China Labor Watch conducted an investigation in 2010 pertaining to labor conditions at local manufacturing
plants in China. 3 0 In particular, China Labor Watch found that these
321. See id. at 185 (stating Western companies need to give consideration to the reality of the conditions in industrial China).
322. See generally Jeanne Sahadi, Crazy Corporate Tax Loopholes? 'Inversions' are
Small Potatoes, CNN MONEY (Sept. 23, 2014, 4:46 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/09/23/
news/economy/corporate-taxes-inversions-and-other-loopholes/ (suggesting corporations
utilize tax loopholes to gain a profit advantage, even if it is at the cost of workers' rights).
323. Nicholas, supra note 191, at 183.
324. See generally id. (implying corporations support efforts to "make the world a
better place" in order to pay lip service to regulators and to garner positive public
attention).
325. Id. at 185.
326. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION: THE TRUTH BEHIND ELECTRONICS SWEATsiioPs, supra note 182, at 13 (stating that as a result of price negotiations with suppliers, the
pressure to make profit falls on the workers).
327. See Nicholas, supra note 191, at 183 (stating that despite having the desire to
"make the world a better place," big businesses refuse to support Chinese measures to
have more open policies).
328. See id. at 185-87 (indicating Western companies can influence foreign factory
compliance with labor standards that are being ignored).
329. See generally TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALIZATION: THE TRUTH BEHIND ELECTRONIcs SWEATSHOPS, supra note 182, at 12-14 (suggesting that like a domino effect, large corporations that are concerned with profits will pressure local manufacturers, which will
negatively affect workers).

330. Id. at 1.
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manufacturing plants violated Article 7(d) of the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.3 3 ' This particular article stipulates that all workers are to be offered "[r]est, leisure and reasonable limitation of working hours."3 32 The investigation found that local
manufacturers routinely do not adhere to this principle. 3
Because
multi-national corporations do business with these habitual violators of
labor laws, they share in the responsibility to make sure business is being
run in accordance to all laws.
Multi-national corporations should proactively take steps to alleviate
these plain errors made by local Chinese governments (and the corporations themselves) that exploit cheap labor and the lack of enforcement of
China's labor laws. One such effort these corporations should engage in
is educating Chinese workers about the Chinese Labor Law. 33 4 Educating workers on their rights under the LCL would empower them with the
needed knowledge to fight for the benefits and wages they are entitled to
Engaging the workforce directly would encourage Chinese
receive. 3
employees to negotiate with their employers as required under the
LCL.33 6 Otherwise, as documented proof shows, employers do not sign
written contracts with their employees in good faith, 3 nor do they inform employees of the legal implications of signing their contracts without carefully examining them.338 By educating the workforce, foreign
corporations could engage in the corporate social responsibility championed by the scholar, Dana Nicholas, and help stop the bad faith dealings
of local Chinese manufacturers. 3 39 This bad faith is due, in no small part,
to the localized handling of labor contract enforcement. 34 0

331. Id. at 92.
332. Id.
333. See id. (concluding some factories prevent workers from enjoying sick, maternal,
and marriage leave and have workers working seven days a week).
334. Nicholas, supra note 191, at 184.
335. See id. at 189-90 ("Labor conditions can improve if Chinese workers can couple
increased awareness of the standards for labor conditions along with the availability of
sanctions to enforce.").

336. See generally

TRAGEDIES

OF GiOI3ALIZATION:

THE

TRUTH BEHIND ELEcRON-

Ics SWEAT-1SHOPs, supra note 182, at 92-93 (discussing how workers do not enforce their
contractual rights because they are unaware of them).

337. Id.
338. See id. at 93 (stating employees are not informed about the specific details of the
contract before signing them).
339. Nicholas, supra note 191, at 184.
340. See TRAGEDIES OF GLOBALZATION: TinI Tizurni BEHIND ELECTRONICS SWEATSHOPS, supra note 182, at 92 (stating no law directly regulates contracts; regulation is left to
local labor laws).
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Additionally, large foreign companies should use their influence to
pressure local businesses to abide by the LCL.34 1 In doing so, they would
help facilitate local change and adherence to the law. Moreover, because
of China's accession to the WTO, compelling local adherence to the LCL
would help improve the perceived integrity of foreign corporations
abroad.3 4 2 If the international business community can unite by holding
itself accountable, educating its workforce, and agreeing to do business
with companies in compliance with the 2008 LCL, then real labor stan3 43
dard improvements can occur in China.
B.

Internal Reform within China and the ACFTU

In addition to the steps that need to be taken outside of China, there
are several that China itself must take to achieve prolonged, substantial
success. China must establish genuine, independent trade unions that actually advocate for the workers.34 4 As concluded by the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, "the ACFTU is not an independent
trade union organization, and therefore, cannot be regarded as an authentic voice of Chinese workers." 3 4 5 Attempts to form independent alternatives to the ACFTU have consistently been faced by repression from
the Chinese central government.3 46 As already stated, educating the Chinese workforce on the benefits of the LCL would put significant pressure
on the ACFT7U to step into the forefront to address the labor issue that
exists in China.3 47
Even though Chinese government officials realize that their current approach to addressing labor issues (putting them out one "fire" at a time),
is not a long term solution, their only response has been an ineffective
effort at rousing the ACFTU.3 48 Moving forward, there are two potential

341. See Nicholas, supra note 191, at 185 (stating labor standards will be improved if
Western companies initiate changes).
342. Nicholas, supra note 191, at 185.
343. Id. at 184-86.
344. See Diamond, supra note 201, at 68 (discussing the international labor movement
to support unions in China).

345. Id.
346. Id. at 71.
347. Harney, supra note 200. See generally SEARCHING FOR THE UNION: TiHE WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN CHINA 2011-13, supra note 158 (suggesting if all employees knew about
their rights, they would actively demand that the ACFTU properly represent them).
348. See SEARCHING FOR THE UNION: TH- WORKERS' MOVEMENT IN CI-IINA 2011-13,
supra note 158, at 47 (discussing the Chinese government's failure to protect workers'
rights). "[W]hen Xi Jinping summoned the new leaders of the ACFTU to Party headquarters in Zhongnanhai and told them face-to-face that China's workers deserved better, the
ACFTU responded with its usual jargon, platitudes and archaic rhetoric while basically
ignoring the issue at hand." Id.
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paths for reforming the LCL system that exists in China: (1) allowing
independent trade unions to form; and (2) compelling the ACFTU to actually represent the interests of the workers as is legally mandated.3 4 9 As
long as the ACFTU remains "firmly stuck in its old ways" and parroting
its mechanical recitation of being in line with the Central Party, it will not
be a viable option for labor reform in China.350
The ACFTU, according to China Labor Bulletin, must be restructured
in order to better serve as a trade union that actually supports workers'
rights under the LCL.si A solid first step to achieve this would be to
consolidate the ACFTU within the national and provincial federations
instead of delegating all policymaking and implementing to all of the various local trade federations.3 52 The national federation could create labor
policy and the provincial federations could act to coordinate and implement those policies. 3 5 3 This would allow more flexibility in dealing with
provinces that are in greater need of labor policy.3 54 The provincial federations could be able to set up centers and programs in cities and other
areas to provide training, facilitate collective bargaining, and provide
other necessary services to workers.35 5 Ultimately, however, a comprehensive effort to educate the workforce of their rights under the LCL is
necessary.
Additionally, the Chinese government should allow the NGOs (e.g.,
China Labor Watch and China Labour Bulletin) to do their work without
fear of intimidation from the government.3 5 6 Labor activists routinely get
questioned and detained by police without formal charges. 57 This intimidation is due to the "politically unstable" and "disruptive" nature of labor
unrest.3 5 8 The government also intimidates activists because the NGOs

349. See generally Kroncke, supra note 132, at 169 (suggesting if independent trade
unions had solely economic functions in mediating employment conditions, there would be
worker advocacy).
350. SEARCHING

FOR THE UNION: THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT

IN CHINA 2011-13,

supra note 158, at 47.
351. See generally id. (stating the ACFTU is presently ineffective and out of touch
with workers).

352.
353.
354.
355.

Id. at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id.

356. See id. at 36-45 (discussing the success of NGOs with collective bargaining and
organizing workers, despite government intimidation). See generally Harney, supra note
200 (stating with China's economy slowing and industrial unrest growing, the Chinese government has stepped up efforts to control labor advocacy).
357. Harney supra note 200.
358. See generally id. (alluding to growing industrial unrest as subversive to governmental interests).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2016

39

The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 18 [2016], No. 1, Art. 1

THE SCHOLAR

40

[Vol. 18:1

receive funding from foreign sources.35 9 Simultaneously, the government
encourages workers to turn away from these NGOs and instead turn towards the ACFTU.3 60 This is distressing because the ACFTU, which is
the only legal union in China and controlled by the government, is believed by many activists and workers to be terribly ineffective in its involvement with labor relations.36 1
C.

Abstract Conclusion

Without the changes discussed above, any "change" would simply be
inadequate to protect the one party that is not benefitting from China's
labor laws: the very workers that make up the Chinese economy. If
multi-national corporations continue to ignore the consequences that
their actions cause, workers will continue to be exploited. These corporations must engage in corporate social responsibility by educating the Chinese workforce of the rights they are entitled to under the LCL. If the
Chinese government continues to delegate the enforcement of its LCL,
then it must ensure that local labor representatives actually represent the
interests of the workers, which they are legally mandated to do. Finally,
if the ACFTU continues to be an inefficient trade union, then the Chinese government must engage in either reforming the ACFTU, or allow
workers to create independent labor trade unions to adequately represent
the workers in negotiations with their employers.

359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See id. (implying that efforts by labor advocates are due to the general belief that
"a Communist Party organ" will often side with management or government interests).
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